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Why  would  one  look  to  small  countries  for  ideas  of  good  policies  or  good 
institutions?  History shows that big countries don‘t have all the answers. 
In the past,  countries looked to the big powers for inspiration when choosing 
social systems, development strategies, or specific institutions.   In the 19
th century, for 
example, Great Britain and its industrial revolution was the model that other countries 
sought to emulate.  Some of its innovations, such as the joint stock company and free 
trade,  are  still  with  us  today.    Others  of  its  institutions,  however,  such  as  the  gold 
standard, did not long survive the end of the century.   
 
Large countries as models in the 20
th century 
For some nations that gained their independence in the 20
th century, the Soviet 
Union was the country to emulate.  Toward the end of the century, of course, the socialist 
model had lost its appeal.  It became evident to all that Russia and the other members of 
the Soviet bloc had failed miserably.   At the same time, East Asian economies had 
ridden capitalism to prosperity. 
Although the issue of market economics versus socialism  had been settled by 
1990, there remained competing models of capitalism.  At the time, many thought the 
lesson of the 1980s had been that Japan‘s variant of capitalism was the best model, and 
that other countries around the world should and would follow it.  The model was said to 
include such institutions as strategic trade policy, administrative guidance, relationship 
banking, life-time employment, collusive industrial groupings (keiretsu), and corporate 
governance that seeks to maximize the capital stock and long-term market share rather 
than short-term profits.
1  
As it turns out, there is indeed such a thing has accumulating too much capital.  
The Japanese model quickly lost its luster in the 1990s, as the speculative bubbles of the 
late-1980s burst and the economy sunk into two decades of stagnation. 
                                                 
1 Vogel (1979) was ahead of his time in hailing the rise of the Japan model.   
Feigenbottom (1995) was behind his time.  Johnson (1982) became a bible on Japanese 
administrative guidance and strategic trade policy.  Frankel (1993) surveyed the special 
features of the financial system.   2 
From this many drew the lesson that the US variant of capitalism had been the 
best  model  all  along.  This  included  American-style  corporate  governance:  securities 
markets, rating agencies, accounting standards, generous compensation for CEOs, and 
pursuit of profitability and share prices rather than sheer size.  The United States began 
the  1990s  with  military  triumph  in  Kuwait  and  ended  it  with  the  longest  economic 
expansion in its history.  Other countries should and would follow the American model.  
The American model in turn lost its attractiveness in the decade of the 2000s.  The 
U.S.‘ reputation for competence and integrity took some heavy blows, starting with the 
Enron-type accounting scandals of 2001, falling incomes among blue collar workers, the 
sub-prime mortgage crisis and ensuing recession, massive budget deficits, and disasters 
in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Where should countries look for a model, now?    Some will respond ―China.‖   It 
is undeniable that the rate of growth sustained by China over the last three decades is a 
miracle of history.  But I find it difficult to think of many Chinese institutions that I 
would recommend other countries try to copy.
2  Even today, China‘s status as the world‘s 
second largest economy owes more to the size of its population than to its GDP per 
capita, which has still to rise above the median level in global rankings. 
We are accustomed to looking to large countries for innovations that push out the 
frontier of governance. But some smaller countries, and countries on the periphery, have 
experimented with policies and institutions that could usefully be adopted by others. 
Small countries tend to be trade-dependent, and open to new ideas.  Countries that 
are small, newly independent, remote, or emerging from a devastating war, often find it 
easier politically to institute radical reforms, than in the US or other large established 
countries.  Not all the experiments will succeed.   But some will.  Those innovations that 
succeed may be worthy of emulation by others.  
Let  us  begin  with  examples  from  countries  that  are  small  in  size,  but  have 
relatively high per capita incomes. 
 
Ideas from Small Advanced Economies 
New Zealand adopted a comprehensive set of liberalization reforms, known as 
―Rogernomics,‖ after Minister of Finance Roger Douglas, starting in 1984.  Perhaps its 
Labor Party should even be given credit for pioneering the principle that left-of-center 
governments can sometimes achieve economic liberalization better than their right-of-
center opponents.
3  New Zealand‘s monetary authorities pioneered Inflation Targeting in 
1990,  originally  as  part  of  a  larger  strategy  of  holding  individual  civil  servants 
                                                 
2 Williamson (2012). 
3 Nagel (1998).   3 
accountable for yearly goals.   Canada in 1991 and then many other central banks over 
the subsequent two decades followed New Zealand in adopting Inflation Targeting.   
Estonia led the way in simplifying its tax system by means of a successful flat tax 
in 1994, followed by other small countries in Central/Eastern Europe and elsewhere.
4  
Switzerland in 2001 put into its constitution the ―debt brake;‖  this was not a rule that the 
actual budget be balanced, like the impractical Stability and Growth Pact of the euro 
countries, but rather a rule that the structurally adjusted budget be balanced.
5  Germany 
emulated Switzerland by putting a similar debt brake into its constitution  in 2009, and 
would like the other 16 members of the eurozone to follow suit. 
Ireland recognized the importance of Foreign Direct Investment, and encouraged 
it by instituting  a low corporate tax rate.  The s trategy to become the Celtic   Tiger 
succeeded -- economic growth averaged in excess of 7% per annum between 1995 and 
2007 – though the economy did enter an unsustainable bubble toward the end of this 
period. 
Canada  has  shown  how  to  run  a  crisis-free  banking  system;  and  it  is  not  by 
breaking up banks that are ―too big to fail‖ into small bits.  The Canadian system is 
concentrated in  five large banks,  which hold  more than 80% of bank assets,  but  the 
authorities  have  never  had  to  bail  them  out.  Public  policy  in  Ottawa  does  not  seek 
artificially to increase the extent of owner-occupied housing by encouraging loans that 
the households may not be able to repay:  mortgage interest is not tax deductible, a 20% 
down payment is standard (unless the borrower takes out insurance) and mortgages are 
―full recourse‖ loans (defaulting does not let the borrower off the hook).   The result is 
that Canada achieves roughly the same level of home ownership as the United States, but 
with far less leverage, fewer defaults, and no systemic crises.
6 
Sweden in 1992 showed how to move aggressively to rescue a banking system in 
crisis while yet taking steps so that the taxpayer eventually gets all or most of his money 
back.
7  This example helped inspire President Obama‘s redesign of TARP in early 2009. 
More broadly, the Scandinavian countries, after deciding that they had swung too 
far in the high-spending socialist direction in the 1970s, made some adjustments in the 
1990s.
8 The ―Nordic model‖ has by now shown that it is possible to combine a high level 
of  social  protection,  social  services,  and  corporatist  labor  relations,  with  market 
economics,  fiscal  responsibility  and  free  trade  (except  in  agriculture).    According  to 
                                                 
4 Including Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia.  Saavedra (2007).   
5 Danniger (2002). 
6 Perry (2010). 
7 Dougherty (2008), Larsen and Giles (2009).  The Swedish example is viewed in 
contrast to the Japanese approach during the 1990s, which was to drag out as long as 
possible a recognition and resolution of their banks‘ difficulties, thereby greatly 
increasing the cost to the nation in the end. 
8  Aslund (2010), Borg (2010).   4 
Anders Aslund, Denmark was the pioneer in the 1980s, in which case we should call this 
the Scandinavian model, followed in the 1990s by Sweden under the prime ministership 
of  Carl  Bildt.    High  female  participation  in  the  labor  force  is  one  ingredient  in  the 
formula. Sweden‘s comprehensive school voucher system may be another. 
Norway has the highest ranking in the global Human Development Index.  Some 
will say, ―that is easy, Norway has oil.‖ But many countries with oil or other natural 
resources squander the proceeds.  (More on this below.)   Norway enacted laws to ensure 
that its oil revenue was saved in sovereign wealth funds. 
The modern Nordics are distinguished by their recognition that they should have 
tax  revenues  sufficient  to  match  what  they  want  their  governments  to  spend.    Still, 
Sweden‘s conservative prime minister 2010 was able to cut taxes on the working poor, 
reasoning that their incentives are adversely affected by high total marginal tax rates 
(whereas America‘s supply siders seem to think that this logic applies only to the rich).  
Prime Minister, David Cameron, reportedly would like to import this idea to Britain.
9 
In the 1990s, the Netherlands decided that its high level of taxation, labor market 
regulation,  and  socia l  protection  was  keeping  employment  artificially  low.  It 
experimented with reforms to make labor markets more flexible, making part-time work 
easier in particular. The result was that the Netherlands became the top job -creator in 
Europe.
10    Crucially,  workers  are  apparently  choosing  part -time  work  voluntarily, 
because it suits their lifestyle , rather than as part of some artificially imposed ―work-
sharing‖ scheme.
11  The ―Dutch model‖ provided some of the inspiration for Germany‘s 
successful labor market reforms in the following decade. 
 
Ideas from Newly Industrializing Economies 
Particularly intriguing are the innovations that come from developing countries, 
or at least countries that were ―developing‖ when they started.  Some of these countries 
have been so successful that they are no longer classified as developing. 
Singapore long ago achieved rich country status, and by 2011 ranked 4
th highest 
in  the  world  in  income  per  capita  (PPP  adjusted)  --  ahead  of  the  United  States.  It 
accomplished this unexpected miracle with a unique development strategy.  Among its 
many innovations were a paternalistic approach to saving and use of the price mechanism 
to defeat urban traffic congestion, subsequently emulated by London.
12 
                                                 
9  Sumner (2010).  
10 About half of Dutch job creation since the mid-1980s has been part-time jobs taken by 
women aged 25–49.  A 1997 EU survey reported that 72 percent of part-time workers in 
the Netherland did not want a full-time job instead.  Garibaldi and Mauro (2000).    
11 Bosch, van der Klaauw, and van Ours (2009). 
12 Goh (2002), Santos (2007).   5 
Famously, Korea in 1957 was at about the same level of income as the newly 
independent  Ghana.  Development  economists  thought  the  latter  had  much  better 
prospects.   Today Korean income ranks 25
th in the world, just ahead of the EU average! 
Part  of  the  explanation  of  Korea‘s  industrialization  miracle  was  its  commitment  to 
education.    The  country  ranks  first  in  the  world  in  test  scores  of  its  15-year-olds  in 
reading, and second in math after Finland.
13 
Costa Rica in Central America and Mauritius in Africa each pulled ahead of  their 
respective  peers some time ago.   Among many decisions that worked out well, both 
countries have foregone a standing army. The result in both cases has been histories with 
no coups, and financial savings that can be used for education, investment, and other 
productive purposes.
14  
Mexico in the 1990s, largely thanks to the leadership of President Ernesto Zedillo, 
adopted non-partisan federal electoral institutions that subsequently in 2000 allowed the 
opposition party to take power for the first time and in 2006 were able to  successfully 
resolve a disputed election.
15    
In 1998, Mexico also pioneered the idea of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) by 
launching the program that was originally called PROGRESA and subsequently changed 
to OPORTUNIDADES.   CCT programs have subsequently been  emulated by  Brazil‘s 
Bolsa Familia and many other developing countries.    They have even inspired reforms 
in New York City.  The Mexican innovation was two revolutions in one:  (1) the specific 
idea  of  making  poverty  transfers  contingent  on  child  school  attendance  and  (2)  the 
methodological idea of conducting controlled experiments to find out what policies work 
in  developing  countries,  which  fed  into  the  exciting  Randomized  Control  Trials 
movement in development economics.
16 
In light of the historical pattern of procyclical spending (that, is destabilizing 
fiscal policy) among developing countries, especially commodity-exporters, it is 
                                                 
13  The U.S., by contrast, ranks 27
th in math, out of 33 countries studied, behind Poland 
and Russia.  (The source is the OECD's Education at a Glance, 2009.) 
14 Frankel (2012a).  Military spending in Mauritius is only about $6 per capita, equal to 
0.45 percent of GDP or 4 percent of spending on education and health. (Brautigam, 1997)  
One might argue that a remote island country has little need of armed forces. But 
Mauritius has in fact suffered the loss of territory to external military force.   The United 
States and United Kingdom took the Chagos Islands in order to build the base of Diego 
Garcia, without the permission of either the islanders or Mauritius.  Of course Mauritius 
was hardly in a position to resist, with or without an army.  But small size has not stopped 
other countries from futile military endeavors. 
15 Henríquez (2006).  In contrast, it turned out in November 2000 that the United States 
had no mechanism to resolve such disputes, other than the preferences of a few critically 
situated political appointees. 
16 Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld (2008),  Rawlings and Rubio (2005).   6 
interesting that roughly one third of them have managed to overcome this weakness since 
2000, and to run countercyclical spending policies instead.
17     
 
Ideas from Commodity-Exporting Countries 
A  variety  of  innovations  has  helped  Chile  to  outperform  its  South  American 
neighbors.
18  Chile‘s fiscal institutions – structural budget balance with the parameters 
estimated by independent panels of experts — ensure a countercyclical budget.  They are 
among the mechanisms that are particularly worthy of emulation by other commodity 
exporting countries, to defeat the Natural Resource Curse.
19 
Chile ran large surpluses during the copper boom of 2003-08, and subsequently 
was able to ease its fiscal policy substantially in the recession of 2009.   This 
achievement was not solely the result of wise policy-makers choosing the right policies.   
They were helped by an institutional framework that was put into place in 2000, and that 
can offer useful lessons for others.
20   Chile‘s fiscal institutions consist essentially of 
three rules.  First, each government must set a budget target.  Second, as in Switzerland, 
the target is phrased in structural terms: deficits are allowed only to the extent that (i) 
output falls short of trend, in a recession, or (ii) the price of copper is below its trend.  
The target for the structural budget surplus was set at zero in 2008 under President 
Michelle Bachelet, which implied a substantial actual surplus because the oil price was 
high and the economy was booming.   Third, the determination of what is structural and 
what is cyclical is made by two panels of independent experts who project ten-year 
trends, outside the political process.  The result is that Chile avoids the pattern of 32 other 
governments, where forecasts in booms are biased toward over-optimism.
21  Chile‘s 
institutions explain why it was able to run surpluses in the 2003-07 boom.  The United 
States and Europe failed to do so in part because their fiscal authorities made 
systematically over-optimistic forecasts during this period of expansion.   
 
Mexico appears again on our list of innovators, for its success in hedging of oil 
export proceeds on option markets.    Producers who sell their minerals on international 
spot markets are exposed to the risk that the dollar price rises or falls. The producer can 
hedge the risk by selling that quantity on the forward or futures market.  Hedging 
provides efficient sharing of risk and automatic adjustment to changes in world prices.    
                                                 
17 Frankel, Vegh and Vulentin (2011). 
18   The structural budget regime is of course but one of many innovative reforms that 
Chile has adopted over the last few decades.   Many of them have been successful and 
potentially worthy of emulation.  Corbo and Fischer (1994), Edwards and Edwards (1991, 
2000), Ffrench-Davis (2010), and); Velasco (1994). 
19 Frankel (2012c) surveys the Natural Resource Curse and some possible remedies.  One 
institutional reinforcement against corruption is the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative.  In 2009 Azerbaijan became the first country designated as EITI-compliant, 
and Liberia became the first in Africa. 
20 Frankel (2012b). 
21 Frankel (2011).   7 
Futures markets have one serious drawback from a bureaucratic or political point of view.  
If a government ministry hedges on the futures market, the Minister receives no credit for 
having saved the country from disaster when the world price falls, but is excoriated for 
having sold out the national patrimony when the price rises.  Better, then, is the hedging 
strategy employed by Mexico:  it uses options to eliminate only the risk of a fall in price 
in the price of oil.  In this way it retains the upside risk while reducing the downside 
risk.
22 
 
The proceeds of commodity exports should be used to establish sovereign wealth 
funds that are transparent and professionally managed, in order to assure that future 
generations share the bounty while investing in assets that earn a higher rate of return 
than the paltry return on US treasury bills, where most central bank reserves are held.   
The model that has been touted most widely is the Norwegian Pension Fund (formerly 
called the Norwegian State Petroleum Fund).  But it may not in fact be the best model for 
most commodity exporters to emulate.  One wants a sovereign wealth fund to be placed 
out of the reach of political influence, and invested solely along financial lines.  This is 
not the practice with Norway‘s fund, where politicians can dictate constraints based on 
social goals.
23 
 
A better model for most commodity exporters is Botswana‘s ―Pula Fund,‖ built 
on earnings from the sale of diamonds. The fund, invested entirely in securities 
denominated in other currencies, serves both as a sinking fund to offset the depletion of 
diamonds and as a buffer to smooth economic fluctuations.  Management of the Pula 
Fund is delegated to independent professionals with instructions to pursue only the 
financial interest of the people of Botswana, undistorted by any political goals.   
Silver Bullets? 
There is a good reason why the phrase ―silver bullet‖ does not appear in English 
excepted when preceded by the word ―no.‖  The same is true of  ―panacea.‖ 
In  highlighting  some  very  specific  institutions  that  could  be  usefully  applied 
elsewhere,  I  don‘t  mean  to  suggest  that  they  can  be  effortlessly  translated  from  one 
national context to another. Many countries would not be able to handle the still-large 
government  sectors  of  the  Nordic  countries,  for  example,  without  corruption  or 
mismanagement.   Land redistribution worked well in Japan, Korea and Taiwan after the 
collapse  of  the  Japanese  colonial  empire  in  1945,  but  in  most  other  contexts  such 
interference with property rights would inflict lasting damage.
24 It is unlikely that the US 
political system could successfully implement the sort of flat taxes that have  worked in 
Eastern Europe.  W hen an American politician  proposes a flat tax it is invariably 
accompanied by snake oil promises of impossibly low rates; when he proposes to open up 
the tax code to simplify it, it comes out more complicated. 
                                                 
22 Duclaud and García (2011). 
23 Holmøy (2010). 
24 E.g., Kuznets (1988).   8 
I also do not mean to suggest that the examples of good innovations that I have 
identified are entirely responsible for the success of the economies in which they were 
made.   Countries  such  as  Chile,  New  Zealand  and  Singapore  have  undertaken  many 
reforms not mentioned here. Nor do a few good policies necessarily determine outcomes. 
As the example of Mexico shows, a country can have a number of brilliant innovations 
and still suffer from  stagnant  growth  for other  reasons.  (It has  been crippled by, the 
relocation of the drug trade from Colombia and by a flood of guns from the U.S.
25)  
Ireland and Estonia were among those worst hit by the global financial crisis of 2008  (in 
part because they had given up monetary independence). 
But a country doesn‘t have to be large like the United States to serve as a model. 
Small countries are often more free to experiment with new policies and new institutions. 
The results include some useful lessons for others. 
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